the first consulate until 1820. One reason for the delay was the monarchy's late start in establishing a consular service. Whereas the origins of the modern consular system can be traced to medieval times, 2 the Austrian Habsburgs had not established their first consulate until after the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718) gave Emperor Charles VI the right to open facilities in the ports of the Ottoman Empire. From modest beginnings in Tunis and Tripoli, the monarchy's consular system gradually spread across the Mediterranean to Europe's Atlantic littoral before reaching Hamburg, Copenhagen, and Helsingor in 1782 and St. Petersburg one year later. By then Emperor Joseph II had also established a presence in the East, with consuls in Canton (1781), Mauritius (1782), and the Bengal and Malabar coasts of India (1787) . 3 Yet the "Revolutionary Emperor" was unwilling to consider formal ties with the rebellious Thirteen Colonies, rejecting an initial offer in 1777 to establish Trieste as the entrepot for trade between the two countries. When the Virginian William Lee arrived in Vienna in May 1778 to negotiate a treaty of friendship and commerce, he was snubbed by the imperial government and departed empty handed a few weeks later. Until 1783, the Hofkanzlei's files routinely referred to American officials as "rebels" and "insurgents." 4 It was only after formal British recognition of American independence that the imperial ambassador in Paris, Count Florimond Mercy dArgenteau, acknowledged a 30 June 1784 letter from his American counterpart, Benjamin Franklin, in which the Continental Congress sought "to cultivate the Friendship of His Imperial Majesty and to enter into a Treaty of Commerce." On 28 September, Mercy dArgenteau informed Franklin that the emperor had approved the proposal in principle. By then, the greffier of the financial council in Brussels, Baron de BeelenBertholff, had arrived in Philadelphia as a "trade delegate" with instructions to negotiate a treaty of friendship and commerce as soon as the emperor had officially recognized the new republic. Yet Beelen waited in vain for six years before his mission ended with word that the emperor had decided against recognition. Rather than return home, Beelen opted to spend his retirement in America, dying there in 1805. When another Habsburg subject in Philadelphia, the Milanese merchant Joseph Mussi, petitioned to succeed Beelen with the rank of consul, he was turned down, despite the support of Trieste's governor and Stock Exchange Commission. Even President John Adams's Christmas Eve, 1799 nomination of Philadelphian John Lamson to be the first US consul in Trieste languished for over three years before Emperor Francis II finally issued his exequatur in January 1802.
The pace of Austro-American engagement picked up slightly once the two countries had concluded their parallel conflicts with France and Britain in 1815 and Austria had reacquired its Adriatic seacoast at the Congress of Vienna. Court and State Chancellor Metternich revived the project for a consulate to match the US trade mission that had operated in Trieste until the loss of the Adriatic littoral to France in 1809. Metternich's first choice for the post was Bartholomaus Baron Sturmer, who had only recently been appointed Austrian commissioner in St.
Helena, where he would have been responsible for monitoring the exiled Napoleon. Although it is easy to imagine Sturmer happily forsaking the watery exile of France's fallen First Consul to become Austria's first consul in the United States, he delayed his departure for four years until 1820, long enough to snare the far more prestigious appointment of imperial minister in Rio de Janeiro. 5 By then Metternich had taken the necessary steps to install Alois Baron Lederer as the monarchy's first consul to the now not so new republic. 6 One of Vienna's motives for establishing an official presence in the United States was to find alternative routes for Austrian exports to South America, which were totally dependent on Spanish middlemen, thereby adding to the cost of Austrian merchandise. Nonetheless, it is clear from Lederers instructions that Austria also wished to "follow the country's enormous progress ... in all aspects of her development, particularly in the construction of steam vessels ... far surpassing other nations, especially the English,... and to report on all institutions, ordinances and inventions which could be reasonably of any use to the Austrian monarchy." 7 Since Austria would not establish formal diplomatic relations until 1838, 8 Lederer was obliged to travel between his base in New York City and Washington for a decade until the conclusion of a Treaty on Trade and Navigation on 27 August 1829.
9 New vice-consulates were soon established all along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, beginning with New Orleans (1837), Philadelphia (1841), and Boston (1841), and followed by those in Mobile, Charleston, Savannah, and Apalachicola between 1846 and 1849. The Austrian Ministry of Commerce reacted with unaccustomed speed to the California gold rush of 1849 by creating a consulate in San Francisco in May 1850, recognizing as it did that "the exploitation of its gold mines, which by far exceeds all expectations, and the influx of thousands of immigrants would open new export possibilities" for what Minister Karl Ludwig Bruck foresaw would be products of "ordinary quality."
10 By the end of that year, Bruck had persuaded Emperor Francis Joseph to complete a system of eleven vice-consulates with the addition of Baltimore, Norfolk, and Galveston.
Although the imperial government appears to have finally overcome the initial political distaste and economic disinterest that had postponed the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations, its engagement in the United States was still handicapped by budgetary limitations, which reflected the United States' low-priority status. Fiscal constraints most likely figured in its decision to delay Lederers elevation from consul to consul general until 1828, despite his insistence that this would delay conclusion of a trade and navigation treaty. 11 In fact, although Lederer received an allowance of 6,000 florins, all of the new vice-consulates were headed by unpaid honorary consuls. Although some were assisted by paid civil servants in exceptional circumstances, the total allocation for the monarchy's expanded consular operations totaled a mere 5 In 1817 in Rio de Janeiro, the emperor's daughter Leopoldina had married Brazil's Prince (and from 1822, King) 12,000 florins (about €165,000) for all of North and South America. 12 On two occasions (1845-53,1871-96), even the New York consulate was downgraded to honorary status and entrusted to millionaires who could afford to bear the expense of maintaining the office themselves.
The reliance on honorary consuls certainly had its drawbacks, beginning with the limited workload that could be asked of them.
13 Honorary consuls could be expected to ignore the flood of regulations emanating from the Ballhausplatz-to the detriment of the monarchy's commercial interests and the expatriates whom the consuls were supposed to protect. As a rule, foreign service officials did not even search for qualified candidates in cities where they wanted to establish an honorary consular office, but simply waited for individuals to step forward, usually by citing the protection and other services that they could provide to the emperor's subjects in their particular locality. The position doubtless offered a certain amount of prestige-though surely more in America than it enjoyed within the Austrian consular service, where postings in the nearby Balkans or Mediterranean were most highly valued. But most applicants sought an appointment solely as a means of advancing their own private businesses under the umbrella of a respected European empire.
As a rule, applicants for honorary consular posts were German nationals from the Hanseatic towns of Hamburg, Bremen, and Liibeck, or other places in northern Germany, who had come to the United States as representatives of their German-based trading houses in major American cities, or were US citizens of German descent. As a result, few of them spoke any of the monarchy's many languages other than German. Although German would have sufficed to advance the monarchy's commercial interests within the United States, consuls representing northern German trading houses were unlikely to use their positions to promote any business other than their own. For this reason, foreigners could only be appointed honorary consuls if there was no Habsburg subject available who was wealthy enough and of sufficiently high social standing-which was not normally the case, since the great bulk of immigrants were made up of people from lower social strata. Only as the century progressed and emigration increased did more imperial subjects even qualify to be honorary consuls. Until then it was not uncommon for honorary consular offices to be established in places like Apalachicola and Louisville, where there were virtually no expatriate colonies, while cities with large communities like Detroit and Los Angeles did not get consulates.
Expatriate colonies that were served by a consulate did sometimes take a hand in the selection process, whether by protesting an appointment or expressing a preference for a consul who spoke a particular language. In 1845, twenty-two Austrian subjects in New York sent a duly notarized petition to Vienna seeking the appointment of a German-speaking consul, preferably the Royal Bavarian Consul Georg Heinrich Seeman. Their initiative may have been aimed at forestalling Emperor Ferdinand's appointment of August Belmont, the scion of a prominent Jewish landowner and moneylender from Hesse-Cassel who was, in any event, willing to become the monarchy's first unpaid consul general. The American Civil War left Vienna without news from its numerous consulates in the South, which had suddenly become part of the Confederate States of America. It also brought a temporary halt to the opening of new consulates in the North and East. Once the conflict had ended, Austro-American relations stood on the threshold of a new era that greatly affected the consular system. The remarkable economic recoveries that followed both the Civil War and Austria's own defeats in Italy and Germany generated substantial interest in expanding commercial relations, as well as consular facilities to service the first great wave of immigrants from the newly fashioned Dual Monarchy. The period from 1867 to 1900 therefore witnessed a host of new honorary or regular consulates, which now dealt for the first time with an expatriate population, albeit one that was in the process of adopting a fresh national identity.
Even before these economic and demographic developments could manifest themselves, the consular system needed to adjust to the Ausgleich's transformation of the monarchy itself. Foreign and military affairs now became "common" responsibilities of both parts of the empire, whereas inter alia trade and the merchant marine became the responsibility of Austria or Hungary. To the world, Austria-Hungary presented itself through its diplomatic and consular missions as a single entity, which was not the case when it came to matters of trade, navigation, emigration, nationality laws, and many other matters. 15 During the 1893 World's Fair in Chicago, Austria participated with a "modest" exhibition, while the Hungarian half of the monarchy was "totally absent." 16 No wonder that imports from Austria-Hungary to the Chicago area totaled only about $600,000, a far cry from Great Britain's $15 million, Germany's $4.5 million, or France's $3 million. Oddly enough, matches exported to the United States from Austria's Bohemian Crownlands were labeled "Made in Bohemia" as if they came from a sovereign state.
Dualism certainly increased the flow of instructions and regulations that now emanated from both Vienna and Budapest. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry, as well as the Austrian and Hungarian ministries of Trade and Agriculture, expected consulates to send numerous, regular reports on a variety of economic issues. By 1904, the normalia on reporting consisted of 107 regulations that called for all sorts of periodical reports to be sent to both capitals in order to give bureaucrats there greater insight into the economic situation in the United States so they could effectively promote trade. From 1875, consulates were under instructions to report their "observations in the field of trade policy" for the preceding year. In 1889, it was discovered in Vienna and Budapest that statistical data on Austrian and Hungarian emigration were missing, "the reason being mainly the difficulty in obtaining reliable and exact data on the movement of emigrants in most important foreign ports," thereby prompting Vienna to instruct consulates to provide detailed information on the subject. As of 1883, following an instruction issued in German and Italian, consulates had to report on bankruptcies of foreign companies that might affect Austrian or Hungarian business circles or creditors. In 1897, consulates were directed to send monthly reports to the Austrian and the Hungarian Ministries of Agriculture "on the status of seed and results of harvests in the most important countries of production," keeping consulates busy writing myriad reports that probably often ended up unread in a drawer. l5 The dual character of the monarchy is also reflected in the collection of Austrian Although Dualism increased the need for officials who could process the Hungarian-language directives coming from Budapest, the intensification of commercial relations also heightened the demand for Italian, since a quarter of all regulations that dealt with maritime affairs were written in Italian, the lingua franca of the Austro-Hungarian consular service. By 1904, when the second edition of Josef Baron Malfatti di Monte Tretto's Austro-Hungarian Consular Manual appeared, consuls-whether civil servants or honorary officials-were supposed to know two volumes of regulations totaling 1,972 pages. Volume II contained the normalia, comprising a total of 506 laws, regulations, and instructions in three different languages, the oldest being Maria Theresas venerable Editto Politico di Navigazione Mercantile Austriaca of 25 April 1774.
Despite the dramatic increase in its commercial responsibilities and paperwork, the consular system's principal raison d'etre was now shifting from commercial concerns like securing an adequate supply of tobacco and cotton for the monarchy to protecting the ever increasing number of Austrian and Hungarian citizens-so-called co-nationals in Austro-Hungarian consular terminology-mostly in order to keep track of those who were at least theoretically liable for military service. Registering such citizens-and having them undergo the requisite medical check-up-created a considerable workload, made more complicated as neither Austrians nor Hungarians were even obliged to register with the nearest consul. Nevertheless, the registration of prospective draftees was subject to fifty-three detailed procedural rules and regulations.
The task was further complicated by the fact that most Austro-Hungarian consuls were at a loss to figure out how many Austrians, Hungarians and, after 1878, Bosnians actually lived in their consular district. Each office was instructed to maintain a register of all resident nationals. Yet it was obvious that persons who had left the fatherland without authorization would not call on the nearest consulate to get registered. Indeed, there was no requirement obligating AustroHungarian nationals living abroad to do so. As a result, consuls generally forewent any effort to arrive at a precise tally of co-nationals, limiting themselves to reporting whether the numbers were "significant," "insignificant," "growing," or "important."
Emigration from Austria-Hungary certainly took off during the closing decades of the century, totaling 353,719 in the 1880s and 592,707 in the 1890s, before surging to 2,145,261 during the first decade of the new century; more than a half million people emigrated in 1907 alone. Since the Civil War, the percentage of immigrants to the United States from Austria-Hungary had risen from virtually nothing to nearly a quarter of all new arrivals (see table 1). Between 1820 and 1910, an estimated 3.5 million Habsburg subjects chose the United States as their new home, with slightly more than half coming from the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. Most of them arrived in New York harbor, with the largest number, like Hiob in Joseph Roth's famous novel, coming from Galicia, where whole districts became greatly depopulated. They usually traveled via Bremen or Hamburg, some also via Trieste. In 1902-3, the close to a quarter million emigrants were made up of German-Austrians (23,597), Poles (37,499), Slovaks (34,412), Croats and Slovenes (32,892), Hungarians (27,113), Ukrainians (9,819), Czechs (9,557), and Dalmatians and Bosnians (1,723).
The Austro-Hungarian consulates were wholly unprepared to bear the burden of serving such a large constituency. Although Emperor Francis Joseph had approved a consular reorganization on 21 December 1871, it resembled the system established in 1850 in that it focused largely on commercial and maritime considerations. This is not surprising considering that emigration from the monarchy during the 1860s had amounted to only 0.33 percent of total immigration to the United States. Consequently, the new organization only partially reflected the presence of immigrants in several rapidly growing American cities, most notably through the creation of a new vice-consulate to serve Milwaukee's large Austrian community. To make matters worse, the consulate general in New York was downgraded to an honorary post, with the funds saved being used to establish a commercial chancery at the Austro-Hungarian legation in Washington, which was to oversee all honorary consulates in the United States.
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By the end of the century, it had become obvious that the Austro-Hungarian consular system in the United States was no longer adequate, particularly in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and Connecticut, where the greatest number of emigrants were concentrated. In 1899, Francis Josephs minister in Washington, Ladislas von Hengelmiiller zu Hengervar, reported that our emigration to the United States has increased in an unheard-of scale since the middle of the 1880s. Our nationals settling here now count in the millions, and with the exception of the southern and New England states there is hardly a major town, or an industrial or mining center in the Union where Austrians and Hungarians have not established themselves in greater numbers. While our emigrants are taking the lead of the columns of emigrants, our consular representation in the United States has qualitatively and quantitatively lagged behind medium-sized European states, remaining at the level of the 1850s, when our only business in America was importing cotton from the old slavery states. 18 Clearly, the time had come to replace the system of honorary consuls. Most of their number had been wholly unprepared to deal with the constitutional intricacies of the Dual Monarchy, which in daily consular life translated into a flood of disparate laws, regulations, and instructions for the Austrian and the Hungarian parts of the monarchy-let alone for Bosnia-Herzegovina-and their respective citizens and inhabitants. Moreover, the changing complexion of international and domestic politics had made the reliance on German nationals untenable. Although it was still customary for German consuls to serve temporarily upon the death of their Austro-Hungarian counterparts, the Ballhausplatz now preferred to keep a certain distance between its consulates and those of the newly created German Empire.
19 Although Germany and Austria-Hungary were allies, there were those among the monarchy's subjects who did not share the sense of camaraderie. In October 1877, it took Chicago's Deak Association only a few days to join Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Andrassy in protesting the interim appointment of the Prussian H. Claussenius as honorary consul because he "distinguishes himself only by his anti-Austrian feelings and his special hate of Hungarians." 20 In 1906, New York's Czech community petitioned the Foreign Ministry for a Czech as its next consul general. The appointment ultimately went to a Thuringian German, who nonetheless advised the Foreign Ministry just two years later against continuing to entrust consular responsibilities in Boston to the city's German vice-consul. Although the latter's track record and facilities were "quite suitable," his office walls were covered "only with portraits of the German emperor and of Prince Bismarck ... with nothing at all representing our Austro-Hungarian consular mission," a situation deemed rather awkward "since 80 percent of the clients of our Boston consulate are Austrian citizens of Polish nationality." 21 By the mid 1890s, the government had finally taken the remedial step of converting several honorary consular offices located in cities with large expatriate colonies like Chicago, New York, and Pittsburgh into regular consulates. In 1897, it even upgraded the Chicago office to consulate general, with jurisdiction over the offices in St. Louis, New Orleans, Galveston, and Milwaukee. 22 From around 1900, alumni of Vienna's Oriental Academy
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-which had assumed the name "Consular Academy" in 1898-were appointed to head the newly established consulates in the United States, bringing with them a more professional approach to promoting trade and looking after local Austro-Hungarian colonies. 24 At the same time, the Ballhausplatz made sure to send at least one consular or chancery official who could communicate in one or more of the Slavic languages spoken by the colony in a given district. Despite these changes, budgetary constraints guaranteed that the prevailing system of honorary consulates remained in place despite the emergence of new and pressing responsibilities that it could not hope to meet.
By 1900, the consular agenda was no longer concerned primarily with trade, but with the welfare and activities of the United States' burgeoning population of Austro-Hungarian immigrants. Admittedly, not all of the more than three million people merited the same degree of attention from the system's underfunded honorary consuls and overburdened bureaucrats. Although the overwhelming majority of expatriates stayed permanently in the United States, numerous consular reports suggest that as many as a third originally intended to return to Austria-Hungary, with a significant, but indeterminate number actually doing so. Thus, roughly a million people were classified at least initially as "migrant workers" rather than as immigrants and were at least theoretically accorded more attention. Yet, given the heavy official workload, even members of this group no longer merited "consular protection" or discrete supervision once they had opted for US citizenship. Not that it was easy to distinguish between the two groups. Whereas the number of people immigrating to the United States was easily available from the statistics published by the Department of Commerce and Labor, Austro-Hungarian consulates did not 20 HHStA, AR, dept. 8, box 44, Chicago, Leg. Washington 689 to Pick, 17 October 1877. Nevertheless, Claussenius was appointed honorary consul and served until 1894, when the consular office was transformed into a regular consulate. Agstner, "Eine Geschichte der Ubersiedlungen-100 Jahre Osterreichisches Generalkonsulat in Chicago," Wiener Zeitung, 7 November 1997, 3; Agstner, "Vom k.u.k. Konsulat zum 6'sterreichischen Generalkonsulat in Chicago," RWR no. 4 (1998): 9. 21 HHStA, AR, dept. In many parts of the country, maintaining effective contact with the expatriate community would not have been possible without the assistance and cooperation of trusted confidants, most notably Catholic clergy, the editors of Hungarian-, Croatian-, and Slovene-language newspapers, and various benevolent societies and immigrant homes that catered to the needs of their respective co-nationals. 26 By 1911, two homes for immigrants from Austria-Hungary existed in New York City. The home of the Hungarian Society was well-subsidized by the Hungarian government, whereas the Austrian government had cancelled any subsidies for the Austrian Society's immigrants' home at the end of 1910, putting its existence in jeopardy. There were also Greater Polish, Pan-Slav, and Jewish homes to which immigrants of Austrian or Hungarian nationality could turn, but which generally attempted to convert immigrants to a political agenda. The board of directors of such associations, as well as a certain percentage of its membership, had to have US citizenship in order to run a home for immigrants or send a representative to Ellis Island. The main purpose of the Austrian and Hungarian homes was to assist immigrants by providing room and board, finding them jobs, and offering helpful advice. They also maintained legal counsel on Ellis Island to facilitate the processing of new arrivals from Austria-Hungary who did not speak English and who were often at a loss to understand the many questions asked by immigration officials and their interpreters. Immigrants without relatives or friends waiting for them were immediately taken to the homes "to spare them numerous unpleasant experiences," oftentimes at the hands of former compatriots bent on defrauding them.
Nor did the hazards end here for the poor, often illiterate and overwhelmingly non-Englishspeaking multitudes who came to America. In 1910, New York City officials reported that more Austro-Hungarian expatriates died of tuberculosis than any other immigrant group except the Irish. Whereas the consulates could do nothing to improve their emigrants' nutrition or health, they did try to assist families left destitute by the incapacitation or death of their principal breadwinner, which was often the result of industrial accidents in the factories and mines where so many found employment. Unlike its Austrian counterpart, the Hungarian government actually bore the cost of repatriating its co-nationals in an effort to "prevent the depopulation of the Holy Crown of St. Stephen." Another group that was repatriated were those prospective but destitute Austro-Hungarian emigrants who had, for some reason, been unable to make the transatlantic voyage or had been refused entry into the United States at Ellis Island. By 1911, the number had become sufficiently large to oblige the Foreign Ministry to upgrade its honorary consular offices in Bremen and Rotterdam, while establishing a new consulate one year later in Basel, where most agents luring emigrants to North America had their offices. Unfortunately, consular officials could do rather less for those who actually reached and remained in the United States. Their reports reflect dissatisfaction with the separate and unequal treatment afforded to foreign nationals both by employers and by federal, state, and municipal government officials, whom they accused of conspiring to escape financial responsibility for workplace accidents. Hence the lament of one officer that "it is very difficult for a foreigner to obtain justice ... in contradiction to all trade agreements concluded with the United States ... where human life counts for little." Not surprisingly, American authorities were less committed to protecting Austro-Hungarian subjects who defrauded or otherwise victimized their compatriots, with the result that consular officials were sometimes able to secure the perpetrators' deportation and subsequent trial in Austrian or Hungarian courts.
By the turn of the century, Austria-Hungary and its representatives in the United States were not only concerned for the well-being of their American co-nationals, but for the mettle of their patriotism. In contrast to Irish and Italians, emigrants from a multinational empire like Austria-Hungary were less able-or inclined-to retain their former identities and ties with their countries of origin. In the view of one consular official, this was because there were no intelligentsia or educated classes from the monarchy to help sustain these affinities among the mostly unskilled, rural workers now toiling in the United States' mines and factories:
Belonging mostly to the uneducated classes, having more difficulties than Germans in adapting to the situation in the United States, they nevertheless find many compatriots in the industrial centers, so that they do not feel lonely and abandoned. To the newcomer they praise all advantages in an exaggerated manner, such as the absence of military duty in the United States, no direct taxation etc. Once the immigrant has learned English (which usually is a prerequisite to get on) he is to a much higher degree exposed to the influence of his surroundings and sees other perceived advantages, which are offered by acquiring American citizenship.... Even if some of them do not acquire US nationality, they cannot prevent their children from attending local schools, where they learn English better than their mother-tongue. In such a way already the second generation becomes American. 27 The absence of a substantial Austro-Hungarian upper crust left the governments in Vienna and Budapest with few instruments for influencing the cultural trajectory of its expatriate community. Certainly the Ballhausplatz was not willing to step into the breach, despite being well aware of the shortcomings of the system of honorary consulates. Although it is easy to attribute its dereliction to financial constraints, the greater reality was that the government simply did not attach a high priority to its relations with the United States and its people, regardless of nationality. William Godsey is doubtless right in concluding that the United States held "little political significance" for Vienna's policymakers and that its Washington embassy was regarded as the "least acceptable" of all the monarchy's missions. Hence the conviction of Baron HengelmuUer that his lengthy (1894-1913) tenure as envoy was intended as punishment by his enemies within the Foreign Ministry, despite his own predictions of the prominent role that the United States was destined to play on the world stage. Although he eventually succeeded in having the legation in Washington promoted to the status of embassy in 1903, its business continued to be entrusted to the same "Referat IV" of the ministry's political division that handled relations with less significant European and non-European countries until 1913, when HengelmuUer was recalled-and succeeded by Nikolaus Dumba, the only commoner ever to serve anywhere as an Austro-Hungarian ambassador.
For the consulates, Vienna's diffidence translated into a patchwork system whereby some cities with few expatriates got honorary consuls because they were available and virtually "Ibid.
kostenlos, while others like Cleveland and Detroit, which had teeming expatriate communities, were wholly ignored. As early as 1896, Cleveland's 400,000 residents included an expatriate community of 50,000, the Austrian half of which dated back to the first wave of emigrants from the monarchy. Moreover, as Pittsburgh Consul Dessefwy noted: "[T]hey remain very much attached to their old fatherland.... There probably is no other place in America where the patriotic feelings of our emigrants have been kept as alive as in Cleveland; 120 national associations (92 Czech and Polish, 27 Hungarian, 8 Slovak) and 18 churches (4 Czech-Catholic, 3 PolishCatholic, 2 Hungarian and Slovak-Catholic each, 1 Slovene-Catholic, 2 Czech-Congregational, 1 Hungarian-Reformed, as well as 2 Hungarian-Jewish and 1 Czech-Jewish synagogues) are striking evidence thereof. There can be no doubt that the steady development of the city and its industries will also lead to an increase of our colonies there."
28 Although a consulate was finally created in 1903, Vienna continued to ignore an even larger colony of 80,000 Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Slovaks in Detroit, which was entrusted, together with the rest of Michigan's lower peninsula, to the new Cleveland consulate. As late as 1912, Cleveland's Consul Ernst Ludwig reported that "in the courthouse and the town hall several official announcements are made public in English, Polish and German, or in English and Polish alone. At a time when the Austro-Hungarian consulates in the United States and elsewhere were under increasing pressure to sustain and promote an affinity for the monarchy among the Austro-Hungarian colonies, the modest consular network was obliged to rely heavily on the assistance of others. New York's consulate general enjoyed the unique benefit of visits by warships of the Austro-Hungarian navy. When the frigate Donau sailed into New York harbor in 1898, Consul General Stockinger hailed its presence "as a welcome opportunity to bring Austrians and Hungarians of the better circles who had not as yet come into contact with each other." participation would have been especially desirable kept their distance." 33 In the end he was left to his own devices in arranging "adequate festivities" that included a banquet for the ship's officers. 34 Of course, there was also a plethora of private clubs, which were usually organized around a particular national group. For example, the fifty thousand Czechs living in New York sustained no fewer than twenty-one associations in 1906, including bicycle clubs, rowing clubs, and choral societies. Yet many private associations were more nationally conscious than kaisertreu. One official complained that "numerous Austrian and Hungarian associations carry flowery patriotic names, yet they serve only the momentary interests of their members in the US and are rarely taken to keep up patriotic feelings among their members. A lack of patriotism, and even more so a lack of comprehension and understanding is to be found with the many who dodge military service and thus deprive themselves forever of the possibility to return home." 35 Clergy from the Habsburg lands tended to be a more loyal and reliable surrogate. In some places, Hungarian clerics conducted evening or Sunday school classes for children in Hungarian in order "to keep alive the knowledge of their mother-tongue." Not infrequently, they assisted in maintaining contact between the Habsburg military and prospective expatriate conscripts. In 1912, Cleveland's new Vice-Consul Pelenyi relied on a tandem of Protestant ministers Boros and Szilagyi and Catholic Bishop Schrembs to meet with prospective recruits in Toledo. 36 The following year he prevailed upon the priest of the Czech St. Wenceslaw Church, Franz Hajek, to brief him on developments and conditions in Detroit's Polish community. And barely three months before the first shots were fired in Sarajevo, the local priesthood in Lorain, Ohio assisted him in arranging a session day, or Amtstag, to muster those liable for military service to the point of announcing it "from the pulpit." The vice-consul acceded to the request of the priests "that the inspections take place before church services, and consequently the medical checks began in the early hours of the morning." Moreover, after mass an ecumenical array of Hungarian, Slovak, and Uniate priests converged to discuss "various matters of concern of our co-nationals, who had appeared in large numbers." 37 Perhaps it was inevitable that the nationalities question would consume much of the consular agenda after 1900, much as it did other government institutions throughout Austria-Hungary. Just as consular officials were under pains to cultivate patriotic feeling, they were also enjoined to keep close tabs on certain "anti-dynastic elements" within the expatriate community, including US citizens who had long since ceased to qualify as "migrant workers." Even as they reported on suspicious activities and "unreliable" members of the colony, they attempted to influence their "conationals" through newspapers published by various groups of emigrants. In the years immediately before and during World War I, the task of supervising subversive elements and newspapers and subsidizing those of pro-Habsburg orientation had become such a high priority that the AustroHungarian embassy in Washington assumed overall control over the consulates' activities.
One of the important tasks of the consulate general in Chicago was to supervise the numerous newspapers published in Czech, Hungarian, or Croat in Chicago by emigrants from the monarchy. Newspapers that were well disposed toward the monarchy, like the Croat newspaper Branik (Protection) were subsidized by the consulate, which bought 200 copies of each edition, while the anti-Austrian Sloboda (Freedom) was not. But they were not the only partisans in this struggle. The prominent Hungarian MP Albert Count Apponyi found this out the hard way in 1907 when he was touring the United States and slated to speak in Chicago alongside former President Theodore Roosevelt. Apponyi's lecture was cancelled on short notice. Although the American hosts gave no reason, the count pursued the matter, later recording in his memoirs that "Chicago is-or has been in those days-the focal point of Czech and Slovak immigration. In Chicago, the political sentiments of our Slovak emigrants were systematically 'czechified.' What happened to me is proof enough of the dimension this agitation had already reached in those days. The Czech and Slovak element, estimated at 400,000 souls, was of great importance to the political life of Chicago, its municipal and state elections."
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The problem was there to stay. As a result of the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-13), Austro-Hungarian consulates in the United States were keeping an ever watchful eye, especially on South Slav activities. In January 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Washington instructed all consulates to report anything suspicious. Consul Schwegel (Svegl) in Denver, a Slovene from Veldes/Bled, duly responded about "the political sentiments among the Slavs living in Pueblo [where] our Slavs ... have organized themselves into three groups: 1. a SloveneCatholic group, 2. a Slovak-Czech-Polish group, 3. a Croat-Serb-Russian group. None of the three groups maintain contact with each other.... The interest in common national questions has dwindled since the depression of economic conditions during the last few years, as more or less anybody has to fight for his daily bread."
39 He also expressed concern that the local Italian consulate general had been courting Italian-speaking Austrians from Tirol and elsewhere, but offered a measure of reassurance by attaching the Italian-Tirolese "Franz Josef I" associations fulsome account of the previous year's birthday celebrations for the emperor "which serves as proof of the interest of our co-nationals and which should not be overlooked." 40 Consul Hauser in Pittsburgh, which Pennsylvania's large numbers of Czech and Slovak miners had turned into a hotbed of anti-Habsburg activities, assured the embassy that his staff was monitoring all South Slav newspapers and would report on their content. He also promised to keep track of any agitators who returned to the monarchy and attempt to obtain personal photographs that would assist in identifying them once they had arrived. 41 It goes without saying, however, that the best efforts of Austria-Hungary's consular and embassy officials proved futile at a time when the monarchy was about to fight and lose a much bigger struggle.
On 28 July 1914, exactly one month after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Within a week, all of the great powers had become belligerents in a conflict that presented insurmountable communication and security problems for the Dual Monarchy's foreign service. On 5 August, just one day after the United Kingdom's own declaration of war on Germany, the British cable ship Teleconia cut the two cables that linked Germany-and Austria-Hungary-to New York via the Azores. 42 That same day, the caretaker of the Austro-Hungarian consulate general in New York alerted the embassy's summer residence in Manchester, Massachusetts that all telephone calls would likely be bugged by 38 "unauthorized persons" and that attempts would be made "by illegal means" to read official correspondence. 43 The embassy promptly bought a safe in which to keep its official despatches, but exercised very little control over their security while in transit to and from Central Europe. Indeed, working conditions for Austro-Hungarian diplomats and consuls in America deteriorated dramatically, despite the US governments strict observance of neutrality. Diplomatic mail shipped on neutral streamers to neutral harbors such as Rotterdam took four to five months to reach Vienna. Although both the consul general in New York and Ambassador Dumba sought a safe alternative means of communication, the result was a catastrophic security breach and a public scandal similar in substance and consequences to Germany's infamous Zimmermann Telegram.
At its roots was a decision by the German government in May 1915 to buy shrapnel and ammunition made in the United States to prevent it from being exported to England. The plan called for Germany and Austria-Hungary to acquire the Union Metallic Cartridge Company (a.k.a. Remington), which exported 50 percent of its total production to the Allies. For this purpose, the two Central Powers would surreptitiously finance the creation of an American company by Germany's Krupp and Austria's Skoda and Steyr companies, which would then buy Remington. Although such a purchase was not strictly illegal or intrinsically harmful to American interests, the Austro-German plan also contemplated organizing strikes in the US arms and ammunition industries, which would directly involve the German and Austro-Hungarian consulates. On 11 June 1915, Dumba, then in New York en route from Washington to the embassy's summer residence in Lenox, Massachusetts, reported having instructed the consulates to establish the number of our nationals employed in the main plants.... I have no doubt that, when the occasion arises, the Magyars will enthusiastically join the strike movement. We have to proceed with extreme caution, as due to some local strikes yesterday already all newspapers were reporting on the provocative activities of German agents in the major arms and ammunition factories. I intend to wait for some statistical data concerning the number of our nationals in question, before our agent will resume his talks with the workers' representative. The whole matter will be ripe in a few weeks. I consider it to be of utmost importance for us and our allies, and what is more, with regard to Russia. Even several hundred thousand or even a million dollars would be a small sacrifice, if we and the German government were to succeed in disrupting the whole American production of ammunition. The movement would have to emanate ostensibly voluntarily from the labor union, which now has a unique opportunity to improve the conditions of workers. If a senator or a labor leader of Irish descent takes the lead, the political motive could openly be admitted. We have to remain completely in the background. 44 On the 28th, Dumba requested telegraphic authorization for the purchase, if it could effect a "considerable delay" in the delivery of American materiel to the Allies. It was only eight weeks later that the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry cabled the one-word answer: "Agreed." Yet the instructions appear never to have reached Dumba in far away Lenox. operation where the Austro-Hungarian consul general in New York and the ambassador in Washington played a tragicomic role. The editor suggested the preparation of strikes in Bethlehem Steel and ammunition factories and in the Midwest. Although Ambassador Dumba did not know Magyar, he received a German translation of the pro-memoria the following morning. As there was no time to code the whole text, Dumba wrote a short accompanying letter to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Baron Burian de Rajecz, a Hungarian, requesting authorization to entrust a Szabadsdg journalist with up to $15,000 to organize a strike in the Bethlehem Steel Works and in the Midwest. Dumba outlined the "desperate working conditions in Bethlehem, with 12-hour workdays, 7 days a week; the white slaves working there would, within a few years, fall victim to tuberculosis. It would therefore be a commandment of humanity to procure a shorter work day and higher wages for our Hungarian workers, making best use of the present situation. This could be done by organizing them in a union and by strikes; the main purpose of the strike would, however, be to disrupt the work of the whole arms and ammunition production in Bethlehem etc.; even a gain of three weeks would be valuable." 46 In the meantime, Dumba hoped to work with the German placement bureau to find jobs for the strikers in other, German-American-owned industrial establishments in the event of a prolonged strike or their replacement by other workers. 47 Given the matter's urgency, Dumba's letter to Baron Burian and the pro-memoria were entrusted to an American journalist, Mr. Archibald, who was traveling the same day by the neutral steamer Rotterdam, which left New York at midnight for the Netherlands, wherefrom Archibald would proceed to Berlin and Vienna. Dumba realized that he had committed a serious blunder on 2 September, when the Sun reported that his "secure means" of communication, Mr. Archibald, had been searched in Falmouth by the British, who had found and confiscated an official despatch from German Ambassador Count Bernstorff. He immediately informed Burian that he had reason to fear that his letter and the pro-memoria had also been discovered by the British. Dumba's apprehension was well-founded, since the despatch to Baron Burian had indeed been confiscated and the US government instantly informed. 48 Washington's official reaction was prompt and severe. On 11 September, US Ambassador Penfield in Vienna addressed a sharply worded letter to Baron Burian: "By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen protected by an American passport as a secret bearer of official despatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs me to inform your Excellency that Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty at Washington." 49 From the very beginning, the Habsburg foreign service was handicapped by a lack of funds, forcing it to rely to a larger extent than other consular services on honorary consular officials. Since few Austrians and even fewer Hungarians had the means and social standing to qualify for the post of honorary consul, many of these positions went to German nationals. As late as 1900, Austria-Hungary maintained only two consulates general (New York and Chicago) and one consulate (Pittsburgh) in the United States, alongside fifteen honorary consular offices. 54 Thereafter, the Dual Monarchy tripled the number of consulates, so that nine of its thirty consular facilities, or 30 percent, were no longer honorary and were staffed by professionally trained officials with a genuine service record. This actually compared favorably with the Dual Monarchy's worldwide system of 474 offices by 1914, of which all but 19 percent were honorary. Yet these changes were too little and too late to stem the tide of ethnic nationalism that was already sweeping though the expatriate community in the United States, particularly once the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and World War I had added even more responsibility for supervising South Slav elements to the workload of Austro-Hungarian consuls. Although the consulates were successful in keeping "patriotic feelings" alive among a portion of the emigrants-mainly Germans, Hungarians, Slovenes, and Poles-until well into World War I, they could do little to stem the tide of unfolding events. The consulates were less successful in supervising "anti-dynastic" elements like Czech and Slovak emigrants, whose activities in the United States helped to bring about the end of the monarchy. An unfortunate development that facilitated this process was the decision in 1915 to move beyond perfectly legal supervision of "co-nationals" to illegal clandestine operations intended to sabotage the US armaments industry. Whereas a more extensive and muscular consular system would have been better equipped to counter the tide of "antidynastic" discourse, it would be naive to suggest that any amount of funding would have significantly dampened either the seductive appeal of nation-states within the expatriate community or the legitimacy it earned within the White House. Yet, not unlike the legions of government officials who served across Austria-Hungary, the small number of consular officials in the United States soldiered on until the very end in a mission that may have been impossible. 
